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The Duty of Confidentiality 
in the Surveillance Age
By Jack Lerner, Michael Frank, Michelle Lee, and Diana Wade
JOURNAL  O F
C
onfidentiality is the cornerstone of the lawyer-
client relationship. The duty of confidentiality 
helps to build a trusting relationship between 
lawyer and client that encourages the client to 
be as open with and provide as much information 
to his or her lawyer as is necessary for proper repre-
sentation.1 Confidentiality also is important to the 
attorney-client privilege, because the privilege only 
protects communications made in confidence.2 This 
is why, when a lawyer wants to talk with a client, he 
or she must ensure that the only persons listening to 
the conversation are members of the legal representa-
tion team or other lawyers from the firm, unless the 
client has specified otherwise.3
As has been discussed elsewhere,4 the entirely 
Internet-based nature of cloud computing compli-
cates the lawyer’s obligation to maintain confidenti-
ality. Recent disclosures about the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) surveillance programs have made 
that obligation infinitely more complex. Indeed, 
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the documents leaked by Edward Snowden reveal 
a surveillance apparatus so pervasive that it raises 
fundamental questions about whether lawyers can 
maintain confidentiality at all when communicating 
electronically. In light of evidence that NSA can 
intercept, decrypt, and retain nearly every type of 
electronic communication5—and that it intercepts 
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and retains a massive amount of domestic as well 
as foreign communications, sometimes including 
 attorney-client communications 6— attorneys must 
now re-evaluate whether the use of cloud service pro-
viders can still be in line with the rules of professional 
conduct in their jurisdiction. Some attorneys, such 
as those working with terrorism suspects, have long 
been concerned that NSA surveillance compromises 
their ability to uphold their duty of confidentiality; 
last year, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), the Supreme Court rejected 
this complaint for lack of standing. In recent months, 
however, this issue has received renewed nation-
wide attention as both The New York Times and The 
Nation have reported that the NSA or other agencies 
have intercepted and/or listened in on privileged 
communications.7 
Before the advent of technologies such as cloud 
computing, lawyers generally maintained all client 
files and information onsite or in physical offsite stor-
age, and were able to manage those files personally 
or with the help of a hired professional. This type of 
practice generally protected lawyers against breaches 
of their duty of confidentiality because access to cli-
ent files was limited to a select few individuals, and 
third parties were excluded.8 All of this has changed 
since the arrival of cloud computing, which has not 
only impacted the way the legal profession handles 
client information but also poses new risks to the 
security of confidential data. 
In this article, we assess what the NSA’s sur-
veillance practices mean for law practices that use 
cloud computing, and we explore what these rev-
elations may mean for the duty of confidentiality 
in general. We begin with a review of how cloud 
computing works, weighing the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of employing an entirely Internet-
based system and examining how that differs from 
the use of an onsite server. We then analyze the 
federal statutes  that authorize government surveil-
lance and discuss these laws in light of the newly 
revealed NSA practices. We conclude that the 
NSA surveillance revelations may have changed 
the duty of confidentiality analysis with regard to 
electronic communications. The NSA’s collection 
authority will partially expire in 20159 and Congress 
is currently considering amendments to legisla-
tion authorizing surveillance. However, attorneys 
with foreign clients or matters concerning national 
security should take the precautions recommended 
in this article, as the NSA may not be forthcoming 
about the scope of its surveillance activity and its 
scrutiny of the communications it collects even after 
new legislation is enacted.
CLOUD COMPUTING IN LEGAL 
PRACTICE: AN OVERVIEW
Cloud computing is a method of storing, manag-
ing, and interacting with data on a system operated 
online—“in the cloud”—by a third party.10 Cloud 
computing has become common in the legal field, 
with 31 percent of practicing attorneys reporting 
that they use cloud systems in 2013, a 10 percent 
increase from 2012.11 The popularity of cloud com-
puting systems is understandable. With a cloud 
system, attorneys no longer have to be physically 
present in their offices in order to work,12 and can 
instead access all of their files from anywhere, using 
almost any device. 
Cloud computing systems can be more cost- 
effective than traditional storage methods. Traditional 
methods require law firms to purchase an onsite server 
to store all client information, which often requires 
firms to purchase more storage space than they need.13 
Cloud systems can solve this problem because a cloud 
provider typically will store data from several different 
clients (i.e., law firms) on a single server, meaning 
that each firm only has to pay for the storage that it 
needs.14 Furthermore, cloud computing can reduce 
the traditionally high costs of hiring technicians 
to maintain servers and other components of an 
information technology system.15 Another benefit to 
cloud services is that data often is stored on multiple 
servers, a process called redundancy. This makes cli-
ent data less susceptible to destruction as a result of 
server failure.16 
It is important to distinguish between cloud com-
puting services and traditional non-cloud-based email. 
In the latter, emails are stored on private servers but 
sent across the Internet (“the cloud”), almost always in 
unencrypted form, to another private server. Email ser-
vices that store emails on the cloud, however, such as 
Gmail, are considered cloud computing. In addition, 
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many individuals and companies maintain their own 
email servers, but use cloud-based backup systems. 
Despite the clear benefits of cloud computing, 
scholars and commentators have raised serious ques-
tions about its use in the legal services context.17 One 
of the main problems is that, with cloud services, 
attorneys have limited control over their clients’ 
confidential data. In the past, law firms typically 
stored all electronic files on an onsite server, mean-
ing that control of the data remained with the firm. 
With a cloud computing service, a third party man-
ages the storage of electronic client data and therefore 
retains much of the control.18 Further, cloud providers 
often hire subcontractors of their own in the storage 
and maintenance processes.19 Law firms considering 
switching to a cloud system therefore must draft any 
service contract or agreement carefully. The contract 
or agreement must ensure that the data being man-
aged by the third party provider is not destroyed 
or revealed to any unauthorized individuals. But 
contractual clauses alone cannot foreclose the pos-
sibility that data will be mismanaged or unlawfully 
disclosed.20 The cloud provider or any of its subcon-
tractors could suffer from problems that impact a 
law firm, such as bankruptcy, acquisition by another 
company, or technical problems, any of which could 
compromise the stored information.21 In addition, 
cloud providers often commingle the data from sev-
eral different clients on a single server; all the data is 
kept together in a unified database and organized only 
by queries from the user interface. This technique 
creates an additional risk that one client’s data could 
be seized or disclosed unintentionally in response to a 
subpoena dealing with another client.22
Finally, data storage in the cloud raises jurisdic-
tional issues. The Internet does not exist in a single 
location, and thus data stored in the cloud is not 
necessarily restricted to a given location. By placing 
data in the cloud, lawyers are potentially subjecting 
themselves to rules of practice or even lawsuits in for-
eign states, where they may be subject to unfavorable 
venues or privacy laws.23 
STATE BAR ETHICAL OPINIONS 
ON LAWYERING “IN THE CLOUD”
Even before the recent NSA surveillance revela-
tions, including revelations involving attorney-client 
communications,24 many state bar associations issued 
opinions relating to the use of cloud computing ser-
vices in legal practice.25 A general takeaway from 
most of these opinions is that lawyers must exercise 
“reasonable care” when choosing to adopt a cloud 
service for data storage.26 Some states go even further, 
outlining specific requirements that attorneys must 
consider before using a cloud. New York is one such 
example.27 To exercise “reasonable care” in New York, 
an attorney must: (1) ensure that the cloud provider 
has an enforceable confidentiality obligation, includ-
ing a provision that the provider will inform the 
attorney if it receives a subpoena for stored informa-
tion; (2) ensure that the cloud provider has adequate 
security and recoverability measures; (3) use technol-
ogy to safeguard data from “reasonably foreseeable 
security breaches”; and (4) understand the provider’s 
ability to move and/or delete stored data.28 
The Massachusetts State Bar requires an attor-
ney to use “reasonable efforts” to ensure that a cloud 
provider’s practices and policies are in line with the 
attorney’s ethical duties. The Bar outlines the follow-
ing requirements. The attorney must: (1) be familiar 
with the cloud provider’s policies for handling confi-
dential data; (2) ensure that there can be no unau-
thorized access to data; (3) ensure that the attorney 
has access to and control over stored data should 
the relationship between the attorney and the cloud 
provider end; (4) ensure that the provider’s policies 
will not result in disclosure of confidential informa-
tion; and (5) ensure that the cloud provider’s policies 
are in line with the attorney’s ethical responsibili-
ties. Importantly, Massachusetts also requires client 
consent before the attorney may use a cloud system.29 
The State Bar of California has released two 
comprehensive opinions relating to the use of cloud 
systems: (1) addressing the broad issue of confidenti-
ality in the use of technologies that can be accessed 
by third parties,30 and (2) addressing whether an 
attorney can have a virtual law office (VLO) and still 
comply with his or her professional duties.31
In the first opinion, the California Bar deter-
mined that using technologies to which third parties 
have access is in line with a lawyer’s ethical duties so 
long as the lawyer considers certain factors before use. 
The first factor is how secure the particular technology 
is compared to other technologies, and whether there 
are any reasonable precautions that can be taken to 
make the technology even more secure. Next, when 
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a cloud provider or other third party with access to 
confidential information can be  punished—either 
civilly or criminally—for mishandling or unlawfully 
disclosing the information contained on their servers, 
an attorney should feel safer using that cloud service. 
Third, when faced with a decision to use a cloud 
system as opposed to a more traditional data storage 
system, a lawyer must consider the sensitivity of the 
material to be stored; the more sensitive the material, 
the less risk a lawyer may take and still be in line with 
his or her ethical responsibilities. A lawyer must also 
consider the potential impact of disclosure on the 
client, as well as the urgency of the situation. Finally, 
attorneys in California must closely follow all client 
instructions, so if a client instructs against using a 
cloud storage system, such a technology should not 
be used.32 
In the second opinion, the California Bar 
addressed the issue of whether an attorney can oper-
ate a VLO, which is a system in which “the delivery 
of, and payment for, legal services [is] exclusively, or 
nearly exclusively, through the law firm’s portal on 
a website, where all of the processing, communica-
tion, software utilization, and computing will be 
Internet-based.”33 The Bar emphasized that the rel-
evant California ethical rules apply equally to VLO 
practitioners and non-VLO practitioners, but that 
VLO practitioners must take into account additional 
considerations, including the credentials of the ven-
dor, how secure data is on the vendor’s servers, where 
data is stored and whether it is transmitted across 
jurisdictional boundaries, and so on. The opinion also 
requires that VLO practitioners take heightened mea-
sures to ensure compliance with their duty of compe-
tence, such as communicating clearly with the client 
to ensure that the client can make informed deci-
sions.34 Certainly, the factors listed in the California 
Bar opinion requiring VLOs to follow extra precau-
tions apply to all lawyers using cloud systems. 
In addition to the formal bar opinions issued 
in California and several other states,35 the law firm 
InformationLawGroup has authored a cloud comput-
ing “Bill of Rights,” a useful checklist of cloud com-
puting features for which users can bargain in order 
to obtain more transparency and reduce the risks that 
come with cloud computing services.36 
Thus far, our discussion has focused only on poten-
tial confidentiality problems posed by the risk that 
a third party cloud provider and any subcontractors 
might mishandle or disclose confidential informa-
tion on their servers. An additional concern exists, 
however, when the government seeks the confidential 
client information stored on a third party cloud server. 
Cloud providers routinely receive such requests, and 
often must comply without notifying the affected party. 
SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS—WHAT WE 
KNEW, AND WHAT WE NOW KNOW
On June 5, 2013, The Guardian published an order 
of the US Foreign Intelligence Security Court (FISA 
Court) authorizing indiscriminate collection by the 
NSA of Verizon subscribers’ telephone records, regard-
less of whether they were United States citizens. The 
order, leaked by former computer technical and secu-
rity analyst Edward Snowden,37 was the first of many 
revelations that collectively generated a new global 
awareness of the United States government’s massive 
electronic surveillance operation. While the revela-
tions shocked the public and have spurred a national 
conversation about government overreach and the 
interplay between privacy and security, it has been well 
known for years that the US government conducts 
broad electronic surveillance in a variety of contexts. 
Client correspondence and data stored on cloud 
computing services can be subject to such surveillance 
because several statutes grant the government the 
power to obtain these “electronic communications,” 
often without notification to the affected party. Until 
recently, however, the public did not know how NSA 
and other government agencies have been interpret-
ing these statutes, nor did the public know what kind 
of collection the FISA Court had authorized. The 
Snowden disclosures reveal a surveillance apparatus 
so comprehensive that it raises doubts about whether 
the confidentiality of materials on cloud computing 
systems can ever be maintained. 
STATUTES AUTHORIZING 
SURVEILLANCE AND 
ACQUISITION OF DOMESTIC 
COMMUNICATIONS
Most lawyers who work in criminal law, interna-
tional law, or on matters concerning national security 
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or terrorism know that the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) or another law enforcement organization can 
obtain a warrant or court order upon the determina-
tion that a communication is relevant to a criminal 
investigation.38 As for lawyer-client communications, 
if the communication or stored information is not 
properly protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
then law enforcement can request a warrant or court 
order to acquire the electronic communications and 
stored information.39 Once the provider receives such 
a warrant or court order, the provider must comply, 
often in secrecy. The DOJ and law enforcement 
organizations are therefore essentially able to collect 
a wide range cloud computing communications and 
information under the broad language and flexible 
constraints of the relevant statutes.40 
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) requires 
a conventional warrant upon probable cause for com-
munications stored in an “electronic communications 
system” for less than 180 days.41 But for communica-
tions older than 180 days stored on a “remote com-
puting service,”42 the government needs something 
less than a warrant upon probable cause, and instead 
may obtain a subpoena upon showing “specific and 
articulable facts” that there are “reasonable grounds” 
to believe that the contents of a communication or 
a record are “relevant and material” to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.43 The service provider may 
not notify the subscriber, and is shielded from liabil-
ity from any lawsuits brought by the subscriber for 
complying with the disclosure order.44 Even under 
a “specific and articulable facts” court order, often 
called a “2703(d)” order, notice to the subscriber 
may be delayed by up to 90 days if disclosure would 
be adverse to the investigation.45 Although the SCA 
does allow a service provider to petition to set aside 
an order compelling disclosure if it is unduly burden-
some, the provider cannot notify the subscriber of the 
petition.46
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) provides that a court may issue a warrant 
authorizing interception of wire and electronic com-
munications if the government agent provides an 
application showing probable cause. The application 
is more strenuous than a conventional warrant appli-
cation, requiring “a full and complete statement” as to 
whether other investigative procedures have failed or 
are reasonably unlikely to succeed or be too danger-
ous, a statement of the period of time of the requested 
interception, a statement of previous applications, 
and, if requesting an extension, an explanation for 
why the current interception failed to obtain results.47 
Additionally, under the Pen Register Act,48 an 
attorney for the government or a state law enforce-
ment or investigative officer can obtain an order 
requiring an electronic service provider to install pen 
registers or trap and trace devices.49 The government 
cannot use pen registers and trap and trace devices 
to record or capture the contents of any communica-
tions under surveillance.50 In order to obtain such an 
order, the government attorney or officer needs to 
certify that “the information likely to be obtained by 
such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”51 If the judge grants the order, 
the government can use either device for up to 60 
days and request a renewal. The service provider must 
comply with the government in the installation and 
use of the device under strict secrecy and with mini-
mum of interference with the subscriber’s services.52 
Because the judge reviews the order ex parte, the sub-
scriber or service provider cannot contest the installa-
tion beforehand. Given the requirements prohibiting 
disclosure, there is no way for the subscriber to know 
if information relating to his or her communications 
is being monitored. This is problematic for attorneys, 
especially with respect to the use of emails, because 
dialing, routing addressing, or signaling information 
can reveal much about the identity and the location 
of the source, potentially undermining the confiden-
tiality of those communications. 
The surveillance authorized under these statues 
means that a lawyer could potentially violate the 
duty to maintain the confidentiality of client com-
munications by failing to exercise proper care with 
respect to selection of a cloud computing service. 
The InformationLawGroup’s “Bill of Rights” recom-
mends that attorneys seek contractual provisions with 
a cloud computing provider and its subcontractors 
guaranteeing that they will fight such government 
requests and will seek to have them disclosed.53 Even 
such contractual provisions do not provide much 
protection, however, given the minimal showing 
required of the government and the secrecy that the 
statutes authorize. 
The US Attorneys’ Manual encourages pros-
ecutors to respect the attorney-client privilege when 
seeking warrants and subpoenas and conducting 
searches.54 However, the guidelines do not create 
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any enforceable right nor do “they place any limita-
tions on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative 
prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”55 Further, 
the DOJ reserves the right to determine which com-
munications are not privileged and then seize those 
communications.56 If confidential information is 
commingled with other material on a cloud comput-
ing service,57 the DOJ may not differentiate between 
the two and may seize the confidential information. 
The DOJ could conceivably choose not to respect 
assertions of the attorney-client privilege, deeming 
the requirements for the privilege unmet because the 
alleged confidential information was stored in the 
same location as non-confidential material without 
any extra security measures. In any event, as a prac-
tical matter, it may be difficult for either the cloud 
provider or the DOJ to separate out commingled data. 
These statutes force attorneys to evaluate their 
cloud computing usage carefully so as not to violate 
their duties of confidentiality and competency. If a 
client would be harmed by the government’s acquisi-
tion of confidential information, then putting such 
information on a cloud puts the client at risk. Again, 
a good contract with the cloud provider may provide 
some protection, but the cloud provider still cannot 
disclose that it is petitioning to set aside or modify an 
order from the government if such an order issues.58 




Congress has granted various federal agencies 
the authority to conduct wide-ranging surveillance 
of communications relating to foreign intelligence or 
national security. Under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the FISA 
Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA), the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act (USA PATRIOT Act), and statutes authorizing 
the issuance of National Security Letters (NSLs),59 
the National Security Agency and sometimes other 
agencies can obtain or monitor data from cloud 
platforms. As is discussed below, at the very least, 
lawyers working with international clients, or clients 
who may have some connection to foreign matters of 
possible interest to the United States, should become 
familiar with these statutes, and the surveillance 
activities of the NSA. 
The law that authorizes the issuance of NSLs 
allows the FBI to obtain customer records without a 
court order60 when the government deems that a record 
is “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect 
against international terrorism or clandestine intel-
ligence activities.”61 With an NSL, the FBI may obtain 
“subscriber information and toll billing records infor-
mation, or electronic communication transactional 
records.” Service providers must adhere to strict restric-
tions against disclosure of the receipt of an NSL.62 The 
service provider may petition to modify or set aside 
an NSL, but courts can only grant such a request only 
upon a showing that there is “no reason to believe that 
disclosure may endanger the national security of the 
United States” or a criminal investigation.63 If the FBI 
or the DOJ certifies that disclosure would endanger 
national security or interfere with an investigation, the 
certification is “conclusive unless the court finds that 
the certification was made in bad faith.”64 
In March 2013, the US District Court for the 
Northern District of California found the nondisclo-
sure restrictions in Section 2709(c) unconstitutional 
on First Amendment grounds. The restrictions on 
judicial review under Section 3511(b) also were held 
to be unconstitutional on First Amendment and sepa-
ration of powers grounds because the statute “imper-
missibly attempts to circumscribe a court’s ability to 
review the necessity of nondisclosure orders.”65 The 
order was stayed to allow the government to appeal, 
which it did on May 6, 2013. There had been no 
decision as of April 11, 2014, when this article went 
to press.66
Despite this decision, issuance of NSLs remains 
an ongoing practice.67 Indeed, the FBI has issued tens 
of thousands of NSLs since 2001.68 This information 
should make lawyers whose practices involve national 
security issues think twice before deciding whether 
to put client information onto a cloud computing 
system. The nondisclosure restrictions enforced upon 
electronic communication service providers dictate 
that, as a subscriber of a cloud system, a lawyer will 
have no way of knowing if the cloud computing 
provider receives an NSL and if the government has 
acquired the confidential information. 
Since 1978, FISA has authorized the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence 
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to monitor electronic communications containing 
foreign intelligence information under 50 U.S.C 
§§  1801 et seq. FISA gives the government wide 
discretion to determine what information is relevant 
and what communications constitute “foreign intelli-
gence information,” thus giving it broad leeway when 
monitoring private conversations.69 FISA authorizes 
electronic surveillance upon a showing of probable 
cause that the target is “a foreign power or an agent of 
a foreign power” and that the facilities at which sur-
veillance is directed is being used or about to be used 
by “a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”70 
Further, minimization procedures must be in place to 
prevent the acquisition, retention, and dissemination 
of “nonpublically available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons.”71
The USA PATRIOT ACT further broadened 
the scope of the government’s surveillance powers 
by targeting domestic communications of US per-
sons. Section 215,72 commonly called the “business 
records” provision, authorizes the FBI to obtain “tan-
gible things” from US persons under strict secrecy if 
“presumptively relevant to an authorized investiga-
tion” to obtain “foreign intelligence information” or 
“to protect against international terrorism or clan-
destine intelligence activities.”73 As discussed further 
below, the FISA Court’s interpretation of “tangible 
things” has broadened beyond “books, records, papers, 
documents, and other items” to encompass telephone 
call records, also known as “telephony metadata.”74 
In response to the complaints about war-
rantless wiretapping during the George W. Bush 
Administration, Congress passed the FAA to permit 
electronic surveillance along with procedural mini-
mization safeguards to protect domestic communi-
cations.75 The government has statutory authority 
to monitor electronic communications stored or 
accessed through a cloud computing service under 
FAA as long as the Attorney General or the Director 
of National Intelligence demonstrates to the FISA 
Court that minimization procedures are in place.76 
Such procedures must aim to collect a minimal 
amount of communications from unconsenting US 
persons, keep such private communications from the 
public, and only collect and retain communications 
to the extent that it is consistent with the govern-
ment’s need to manage foreign intelligence informa-
tion.77 Yet, as we discuss below, documents leaked 
by Snowden reveal that minimization procedures 
approved by the FISA Court have allowed many 
domestic communications to be swept up in surveil-
lance activities by the NSA, even attorney-client 
privileged communications.78 
Under Section 702 of the FAA,79 the Attorney 
General and the Director of National Intelligence 
have the authority to order an electronic communi-
cation service provider to “immediately provide the 
Government with all information, facilities, or assis-
tance necessary to accomplish the acquisition” of elec-
tronic communications and to prohibit the provider 
from notifying the involved parties.80 As long as the 
government (1) either receives approval of certifica-
tion from the FISA Court or determines that exigent 
circumstances require immediate implementation of 
surveillance, and (2) none of the communications 
intentionally target US persons or communications 
within the United States, electronic communica-
tions81 can be targeted without notification to the 
subscribers of electronic communication services.82 
The service provider must facilitate the government’s 
electronic surveillance of a subscriber’s electronic 
communications under strict secrecy and with mini-
mum interference of service to the subscriber.83 
Additionally, under Section 703 of the FAA, the 
FISA Court may permit the targeting of electronic 
communications of a US person reasonably believed 
to be located outside the United States. This provi-
sion permits the NSA to conduct electronic surveil-
lance or acquire stored electronic communications or 
data.84 Again, the electronic service provider must 
comply under secrecy.85
Even before the Snowden disclosures, we knew 
that the NSA’s surveillance activities were extensive. 
Accordingly, many lawyers working with interna-
tional clients or on international matters were already 
concerned about such activities. In 2005, the New 
York Times revealed that AT&T had permitted the 
NSA to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance 
of private communications by allowing it to put split-
ters in AT&T cables.86 The Snowden revelations are 
significant because they reveal that the NSA and the 
FISA Court are broadly interpreting the FAA and 
the PATRIOT Act to authorize the NSA to moni-
tor electronic communications that experts and the 
public alike had presumed were not susceptible to sur-
veillance under those Acts. Such revelations should 
be an impetus to rethink the ramifications of putting 
confidential communications and data in the cloud. 
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The Snowden documents reveal that the NSA 
has been acquiring massive amounts of domestic 
Internet and communications metadata, in addi-
tion to many communications themselves. At least 
from 2007 to 2011, domestic Internet metadata was 
collected under the principle that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists with regard to metadata, 
and that therefore Fourth Amendment protections 
were not applicable.87 We also can assume that the 
NSA can access the metadata of emails and other 
communications processed by cloud computing ser-
vices. Lawyers with the ACLU have expressed deep 
concern over the collection of metadata, claiming 
that the context of a phone call can be gleaned from 
simple indicators such as the time of the call and the 
location of the callers, and therefore argue that such 
data is confidential.88
The Verizon Court Order issued by the FISA 
Court in 2013 reveals that the NSA is collecting the 
domestic telephony metadata of Verizon subscrib-
ers pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT 
ACT.89 That provision authorizes the acquisition of 
“tangible things” “presumptively relevant to an autho-
rized investigation” “against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities.”90 The Wall 
Street Journal reports that the FISA Court is interpret-
ing “relevant” under that section as anything poten-
tially relevant to national security,91 and the FISA 
Court also appears to have concluded that telephony 
metadata constitutes a “tangible thing” under Section 
215.92 The government has since admitted that the 
NSA is collecting virtually all domestic telephony 
metadata.93 These revelations suggest that the FISA 
Court also could be interpreting Internet metadata 
as a “tangible thing” and authorizing applications for 
the acquisition of such metadata under Section 215. 
If so, the FBI and the DOJ would have another means 
by which to obtain electronic metadata stored or 
accessed on cloud computing services. 
The Snowden documents further reveal that the 
NSA also has been acquiring electronic communica-
tions by tapping fiber optic cables and interfering 
with encryption standards. Documents provided to 
The Guardian reveal that GCHQ, the UK’s version 
of the NSA, is tapping fiber optic cables and sharing 
information with the NSA.94 The Washington Post 
has reported that the US government has developed 
security agreements with foreign telecommunica-
tions companies, buying US fiber optic networks 
that allow the government unrestricted access to the 
cables.95 Given that data processed on cloud comput-
ing systems can be routed to various servers across 
the world, client information could be accessed if it 
flows through such cables. Further, documents reveal 
that the NSA and GCHQ have been secretly tap-
ping into Google and Yahoo’s fiber cable data hubs, 
enabling the agencies to collect hundred of millions 
of communications.96
The revelations do not stop there. According to 
The Guardian, the NSA has been systematically work-
ing to undermine encryption used to protect emails, 
banking and medical records by inserting “secret 
 vulnerabilities—known as backdoors or trapdoors—
into commercial encryption software.”97 The govern-
ment also has demanded encryption keys from at least 
one service provider. In June 2013, the FBI ordered 
Ladar Levinson, the founder of Lavabit, the email 
system used by Snowden, to turn over all of Lavabit’s 
encryption keys so that the government could unlock 
Snowden’s email. Yet those keys also would have 
unlocked the emails of all 400,000 Lavabit users.98 
Levinson resisted for two days and then complied 
after shutting down Lavabit. Declassified court docu-
ments reveal that Levinson complied with requests 
for subscriber information in the past, suggesting 
that we may no longer be able to trust encryption as 
a means to ensure privacy and security of electronic 
communications. Naturally, these revelations compli-
cate the analysis that previous bar opinions on cloud 
computing require. 
Finally, some of the Snowden documents suggest 
that the NSA’s prior minimization procedures have 
been largely unsuccessful in separating domestic and 
foreign communications.99 A set of minimization 
procedures signed by Attorney General Eric Holder 
reveals that, at least in 2009, the NSA was acquiring 
and retaining many domestic communications, and 
that there were many exceptions to the minimization 
procedures. For example: 
• The procedures give NSA discretion to depart 
from minimization procedures in order to protect 
against immediate threat to national security or 
human life.100
• Acquired domestic communications are retained 
for up to five years and may be forwarded to 
analytic personnel for producing intelligence 
information from the data.101
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• All encrypted communications are retained for 
up to five years.102
• The NSA can forward information to foreign gov-
ernments, the FBI, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).103
• Communications regarding a criminal indict-
ment between a client and an attorney are to be 
considered privileged, but not communications 
related to foreign intelligence information. In 
addition, the DOJ does not consider attorney-
client communications regarding civil matters, 
apparently including international trade negotia-
tions,104 to be privileged.105
In addition to purposeful surveillance, The 
Washington Post reports that an internal NSA audit 
from 2012 reveals that the NSA “has broken privacy 
rules or overstepped its authority thousands of times 
each year” since 2008 and that “[m]ost of the infrac-
tions involve unauthorized surveillance of American 
or foreign intelligence targets in the United States[,]” 
ranging from “significant violations in the law to 
typographical errors.”106
SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CLOUD COMPUTING 
Of all the Snowden revelations, we have iden-
tified three that should significantly change how 
attorneys should think about the ethics of cloud 
computing. 
First, we now know that the NSA has the power to 
collect an incredibly wide range of communications, is 
interpreting this power broadly, and is collecting vast 
amounts of domestic  communications—including 
some attorney-client privileged communications.107 
Essentially, the NSA targets any communications 
presumed to have been made outside the United 
States and by non-US persons if found relevant 
to foreign intelligence information.108 As leaked 
documents show, the FISA Court, NSA, and DOJ 
have been interpreting the relevant statutes very 
broadly. 
This broad collection has special implications 
for lawyers who deal with international clients or 
international matters, such as matters concerning 
national security or allegations relating to terrorism. 
In addition, the entirely online nature of a cloud 
system also means that stored communications and 
metadata are much more susceptible to NSA inter-
ception than information stored in an onsite server. 
Attorneys who have foreign clients, conduct com-
munications abroad, or have matters that could be 
found relevant to “foreign intelligence information” 
should seriously reconsider whether to utilize cloud 
services in light of these revelations. A recent article 
in The New York Times revealed that Australia’s intel-
ligence program sought guidance from the N.S.A. on 
conducting surveillance on communications between 
the Indonesian government and an American law 
firm.109 This revelation suggests that attorneys com-
municating about issues of economic importance to 
the US government, such as trade practices with 
foreign nations, will need to consider the possibility 
that the government will conduct surveillance of 
such communications.110
Second, we now know that minimization proce-
dures do not segregate communications with a fine-
mesh sieve. Leaked documents such as the NSA audit 
demonstrate that many domestic communications are 
inadvertently swept up during surveillance. The NSA 
retains these communications for up to five years 
and sometimes passes them along to the CIA or the 
FBI. According to leaked minimization procedures, 
in 2009 the NSA also was collecting some domestic 
communications.111 The procedures revealed that the 
NSA was authorized to presume that communications 
were foreign if there was any doubt about the origin 
of those communications or if the NSA analyst was 
at least 51 percent sure that one of the conversants 
was a non-US person.112 In addition, we have learned 
that the NSA has been giving the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) tips based on intelligence learned from 
retained communications, and the DEA and the IRS 
do not disclose the NSA as the source of the informa-
tion.113 Further, if the NSA determines that it has the 
authority to review the acquired data, it may keep it, 
if such communications are deemed to be of potential 
relevance to foreign intelligence information at some 
future point. Finally, while the 2009 minimization 
procedures mandate that privileged communications 
in a criminal case be segregated, there was no similar 
restraint for civil matters.114 Accordingly, attorneys who 
use a cloud system when communicating with clients 
may be putting their clients at risk of government 
surveillance, especially if the client had retained the 
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attorney for a civil matter. And criminal attorneys 
should be aware that, on occasion, federal agencies 
get tips gleaned from NSA surveillance.
Third, we now know that encryption is not 
as secure as originally thought. The leaked 2009 
minimization procedures indicate that, at least at that 
time, the NSA was retaining all encrypted foreign 
communications and, alarmingly, even encrypted 
domestic communications, for up to five years. This 
practice, combined with the NSA’s newly revealed 
efforts to undermine or break common Internet 
encryption standards suggests that encryption may no 
longer be a valid security measure. 
CAN CLOUD COMPUTING 
SERVICES STILL BE USED AFTER 
THESE REVELATIONS? 
We’ve long known that law enforcement agencies 
can monitor electronic communications and meta-
data in a variety of ways, such as with a warrant upon 
probable cause or under varying standards set forth in 
ECPA, the SCA, and the NSL statutes.115 It also has 
long been true that the government’s ability to monitor 
attorney-client privileged communications generally 
has been restricted as a matter of practice. Against 
this backdrop, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
and various state bar associations generally have deter-
mined that using a cloud service is ethical as long as the 
attorney conducts his or her due diligence and exer-
cises reasonable care in choosing a service provider.
We now know, however, that the federal govern-
ment is routinely collecting an astonishing range of 
information. In light of the Snowden disclosures and 
subsequent reporting and declassifications, it is now 
safe to assume that the government is collecting the 
following: nearly all domestic telephony metadata 
(and large amounts of domestic Internet metadata);116 
millions of domestic communications;117 nearly all 
electronic communications with non-US persons;118 
and millions of encrypted communications.119 We 
can no longer assume that security measures such as 
encryption protect against such surveillance. Broad 
government access to these communications was 
once the occasional event; now, it is seems that it 
is closer to the norm. In this brave new world, can 
a lawyer use cloud systems, or even email for that 
matter, and still adhere to the duty of confidentiality?
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
RESTS ON REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The question of whether an attorney has fulfilled 
his or her duty of confidentiality rests heavily upon 
the question of whether the attorney had a “reason-
able expectation of privacy,” a principle that has its 
roots in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In his 
concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan 
posited that a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
exists when one has a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy, and society is willing to recognize that expec-
tation.120 In the Fourth Amendment context, the 
Supreme Court has since adopted Justice Harlan’s test 
for determining whether a “reasonable expectation 
privacy exists” in communications, and thus, whether 
a warrant is necessary to obtain records of such com-
munications or conduct surveillance.121 
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit 
held that a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
emails is not extinguished by a third party intermedi-
ary’s “mere ability” or right to access those commu-
nications.122 The court found that users subjectively 
expect privacy in email communications and that 
society is willing to recognize such an expectation.123 
Along similar lines, many state bars have determined 
that the Fourth Amendment “reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy” standard applies to email and that 
an attorney’s use of unencrypted email transmitted 
through several ISPs does not violate the duty of con-
fidentiality as long as the attorney takes reasonable 
steps to protect the communications from disclosure 
to third parties.124 
The problem with the Snowden revelations is 
that they threaten to vitiate any subjective “reason-
able expectation of privacy” with regard to wide 
swaths of email communications and cloud comput-
ing. If attorneys are aware of the NSA’s broad sweep-
ing data collection effort—as they should be, given 
that they must “keep abreast of changes in the law 
and its practice”125—can attorneys still assert a sub-
jective expectation that electronic communications 
are confidential? If the NSA surveillance revela-
tions undermine an attorney’s subjective expectation 
that his or her communications are private, the 
attorney is violating the letter of most bars’ rules 
setting forth the duty of confidentiality. This is what 
Amnesty International argued in Clapper v. Amnesty 
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International USA, relying in part on an expert dec-
laration from legal ethics expert Professor Stephen 
Gillers. Amnesty argued that continuing to use 
electronic communications when attorneys “believe 
that their electronic communications will likely be 
monitored” is “violat[ing] ethical rules and expos[ing] 
themselves to possible bar discipline.”126 
Post-Snowden, the ethical quandary is even 
more far-reaching: If key aspects of nearly all com-
munications are being retained and are subject to 
surveillance at the whim of the government, how can 
attorneys ethically use electronic communications at 
all? In answering this question, perhaps we can make a 
distinction between communications that the lawyer 
reasonably expects will be subject to surveillance such 
as correspondence with a terrorism suspect, and purely 
domestic communications that have no criminal law 
component and the lawyer presumes would not be 
of interest to government entities. But the Snowden 
revelations make that distinction fuzzy at best, as the 
New York Times’s reporting about the government’s 
possible surveillance of Mayer Brown, a law firm 
working with the Indonesian government on trade 
issues, makes clear.127 In our view, the NSA surveil-
lance programs and their porous protections for large-
client communications make it extremely hard for 
attorneys with certain practices to honor the duty of 
confidentiality—those touching on national security, 
terrorism, foreign relations, or international economic 
issues, for example. But where does that group end and 
the rest of the legal profession begin? We know of no 
reliable rubric by which to determine whether one is 
a target; indeed, in a system in which vast amounts of 
data are intercepted and retained in case they may be 
of interest at a later time, that may be impossible to do. 
Does that mean that no attorney can now ethically 
use electronic communications? These are uncharted 
waters, and lawyers must tread carefully. But we think 
that given the impracticability of eliminating elec-
tronic communications with one’s clients in today’s 
increasingly online environment, it is unlikely that 
courts and state bars will interpret the Snowden rev-
elations to mean that no one can now use electronic 
communications and cloud storage. In fact, one court 
has held that, even if an individual suspected NSA sur-
veillance and acted accordingly,128 such an individual 
could still have a reasonable expectation of privacy.129 
Clearly, however, attorneys who harbor any 
reasonable suspicion that their communications may 
be of interest to the NSA or law enforcement, now 
have a heightened duty to protect the confidentiality 
of privileged materials. And cases such as Amnesty 
International v. Clapper and ACLU v. NSA,130 which 
dismissed for lack of standing attorneys’ arguments 
that they couldn’t do their work because they sus-
pected that they were under surveillance, likely no 
longer apply. The revelation that the NSA shares 
information gleaned from its surveillance with agen-
cies such as the DEA and the FBI, and to other coun-
tries, only underscores that conclusion. 
APPLYING THE PREVIOUS 
GUIDANCE FROM STATE BARS
It is now clear that for an attorney to adhere to 
his or her the duty of confidentiality while continu-
ing to use electronic communications, he or she must 
thoroughly consult the applicable statutes and profes-
sional codes of conduct and make careful choices in 
choosing a service provider, considering especially 
the available security measures. While the courts 
have analyzed reasonable expectation of privacy in 
a piecemeal fashion, various state bars have analyzed 
the ethics of cloud computing more comprehensively. 
We now turn to that analysis. 
Take, for example, California Business & 
Professional Code § 6068, which states that an attor-
ney must “maintain inviolate the confidence, and at 
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets 
of his or her client,” and the attorney only may reveal 
information to prevent a criminal act that would 
result in death or serious bodily harm to an individ-
ual.  Because of this strict wording, an attorney must 
take every step possible to preserve the confidence 
of privileged client communications. Given that we 
know the NSA has been monitoring domestic com-
munications, attorneys in California who put client 
communications onto electronic systems arguably are 
not “maintain[ing] inviolate” the confidentiality of 
said communications. The comments to California 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.100, however, allow 
an attorney to reveal confidential information if the 
client has given informed consent.131 At a minimum, 
attorneys practicing in California should not use 
cloud services for client communication without 
first obtaining informed consent from the client. It 
is essential, however, that California attorneys still 
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proceed with caution, even after receiving informed 
consent from the client. 
Under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the analysis is slightly different. Rule 1.6(a) 
allows an attorney to reveal confidential information 
if the client gives informed consent. But Rule 1.6(c) 
is less restrictive than the equivalent California rule, 
because it instructs an attorney to make “reasonable 
efforts” to prevent “inadvertent or unauthorized disclo-
sure of … information relating to the representation of a 
client.” Under these provisions, using a cloud system for 
client communications may be an ethical practice, if the 
measures the attorney takes to secure his or her client’s 
data are reasonable. Such measures may include the use 
of encrypting and considering the likelihood of inadver-
tent disclosure, the harm to the client if the information 
is disclosed, and the sensitivity of the information.132 
Thus, even though the NSA is monitoring metadata, 
foreign communications, and much more, it may be 
that the monitoring presents little real risk of harm 
to the client. In any event, the attorney can obtain 
informed consent from his or her client about the risk 
of government surveillance and, with that consent, may 
still be able to ethically continue use of a cloud service. 
The NSA revelations also change how lawyers 
should evaluate different cloud services. For example, 
in 2010 the New York State Bar emphasized that a 
“lawyer should periodically reconfirm that [a] provider’s 
security measures remain effective in light of advances 
in technology.” Because we now know that encryption 
is not necessarily an effective means against disclosure, 
using a cloud service in New York could conceivably 
no longer be in line with an attorney’s ethical duties.133 
These revelations likely have a similar impact on 
attorneys practicing in Massachusetts. To qualify as 
taking “reasonable efforts” in Massachusetts, an attor-
ney must look at a cloud provider’s existing practices 
“to reasonably ensure that data stored on the provider’s 
system actually will remain confidential, and will not 
be intentionally or inadvertently disclosed or lost.”134 
If encryption is no longer effective against intentional 
or inadvertent disclosure, cloud systems could con-
ceivably no longer be ethical in Massachusetts atleast 
without informed consent.135
The California State Bar’s Formal Opinion No. 
2010-179 contains similar guidance. That opinion 
instructed that if a lawyer were to use a public wireless 
connection, the attorney would “ris[k] violating his 
duties of confidentiality and competence … unless he 
takes appropriate precautions, such as using a combi-
nation of file encryption, encryption of wireless trans-
missions and a personal firewall.”136 However, if the 
attorney uses wireless connections entirely to access 
his or her cloud systems and it is known that the 
NSA can break Internet encryption, the precautions 
become useless. Thus cloud computing—along with 
sending emails and making phone calls abroad—could 
conceivably no longer meet the standard of the 2010-
179 opinion that requires an attorney to reasonably 
believe the communications to be confidential.137 The 
NSA’s aggressive decryption activity is just the type of 
technological and security change that requires the 
attorney to re-evaluate his or her use of a cloud system.
At this juncture, the decision to adopt cloud 
computing or continue using electronic forms of com-
munications still rests heavily on the attorney’s own 
judgment. The attorney must complete the objective 
and subjective “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
analysis and then conduct additional analysis regard-
ing security and confidentiality of communications as 
laid out in the Model Rules and state bar opinions. 
The attorney must consider the sensitivity of the cli-
ent’s identity, geographic location, nationality, and 
legal needs as the analysis will depend heavily on 
these factors,138 and in most if not all cases, obtain 
informed consent from his or her client. In addition 
the attorney must get to know the technology, care-
fully negotiate contracts with cloud providers, and 
use encryption at every turn. If the attorney has done 
so, in many cases he or she can use email and cloud 
computing services and still adhere to the duties of 
confidentiality and competency.
All of that may change as we continue to learn 
more about the extent of the NSA’s activities and that 
of its partners around the world and as the reasonable 
expectation of privacy jurisprudence develops.
CONCLUSION 
The NSA surveillance revelations require attor-
neys to re-evaluate the security of communications over 
the Internet and “in the cloud.” With the newly dis-
covered practices of the NSA, there are questions as to 
whether the conclusions of the previous state bar opin-
ions that approved of cloud computing are still control-
ling. In our view, while some attorneys may be able to 
adopt cloud computing and still adhere to their duties 
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of confidentiality and competency, many attorneys will, 
and should, decide not to use cloud computing. In some 
cases, a subjective belief of confidentiality simply can-
not be held in good faith in light of NSA surveillance 
practices. For this reason, at the very least, attorneys 
always should obtain informed consent from their cli-
ents before using cloud services. After the attorney has 
done so, he or she must then take reasonable measures 
to protect these communications and information to 
fully adhere to his or her duty of confidentiality. Either 
way, whether an attorney is ethical in adopting cloud 
computing rests heavily on the individual, fact-specific 
factors, and the attorney’s judgment. 
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